Reducing public complaints and use of force: the Portland police bureau experience
Background
Across 2014 and 2015 police in the United States faced a major public backlash over excessive force, oppressive conduct and racial discrimination allegations associated with high profile fatal shootings. President Barrack Obama went so far as to state that a 'simmering distrust' existed between police and minority communities (in Holland and Edwards 2014, p. 1) . The situation served to highlight the importance of identifying policing practices that reduce force and encourage positive relations between police and their communities. The establishment of effective oversight measures and complaint processes, as well as proactive policy and training reforms around force tactics, form an important part of this framework for action (Department of Justice, 2015) .
Police represent a key form of state power and are frequently called on to intervene in charged situations where their actions can antagonise some citizens. In light of this often adversarial relationship, policing is characterised by large volumes of complaints from the public. In many locations, complaints have been either stuck at high and stable rates or trending upwards, with very few cases of significant reductions on the record (Prenzler, Porter and Alpert, 2013) . Complaints are often used as a performance indicator for police. However, as a measure of behaviour they have limitations in terms of accuracy and comparability across jurisdictions (Brandl, Stroshine and Frank, 2001; Hickman, 2006) . Many citizens who are unhappy about their experiences with police do not complain as a result of fear of reprisal or the belief that complaining will not make a difference (Smith, 2009) . For example, a national study in the United States found that 75% of persons who experienced force by police thought the force was excessive, while only11% claimed to have lodged a complaint (Hickman, 2006) . In contrast, some complainants will be motivated by malice, and others may be misinformed about police actions or have unrealistic expectations of police. In many cases only a small percentage of complaints against police are substantiated -typically 10% -often because of insufficient evidence (Hickman, 2006) . Despite these problems, there are a number of reasons why the management of complaints can serve strategic purposes related to better policing (Hickman, 2006) . Research highlights the apparent honesty and sincerity of most complainants (e.g., Maguire and Corbett, 1991) . Complaints can therefore draw attention to a larger underlying problem of community dissatisfaction. More rigorous complaint processes, including the introduction of independent oversight, can also boost substantiation rates, adding to a stronger picture of inappropriate conduct by officers (Smith, 2009) . The rapidly increasing availability of CCTV and mobile phone video also appears to be contributing to increased substantiation rates, indicating a likely stronger basis to complaints than could previously be demonstrated (e.g., Morales, 2015) . The potential for a behavioural basis to complaint rates is also evidenced by cases of large reductions in complaints related to changed police procedures (below). Complaints data are particularly valuable therefore as a measure of the impact of reforms targeted at addressing police-community conflict and possible inappropriate policing tactics (Hickman, 2006) .
Complaints data can be enhanced with additional indicators to provide a multidimensional picture of behavioural issues. These include officer-completed use of force reports and officer-involved shooting data (Atherley & Hickman, 2006) . Again, however, these sources have limitations. Police use of force is generally an infrequent event, and issues in defining force make it difficult to precisely determine the extent and nature of force events. Additionally, officer self-report and official agency reports may be subject to bias, although they remain amongst the most cost-effective ways to track incidents Dunham, 2004, Department of Justice, 2015) .
In light of the discussion above, it can be argued that reducing the trifecta of complaints (including force-related allegations), force incidents and officer-involved shootings should be major goals for law enforcement. At the same time, the literature has documented numerous obstacles that police and political leaders have faced when trying to institute police reform measures, including union opposition and organisational subversion (e.g., Skogan, 2008) . While citizen oversight agencies have been introduced to provide a more independent for dealing with complaints, there are also opportunities for police and oversight agencies to work together in addressing police conduct issues (Porter, 2013 ).
The scientific literature shows support for a range of strategies likely to improve policing and citizen responses, reflected in reduced complaints and other adverse indicators. These include early intervention systems designed to address the behaviour of officers that attract repeat complaints, more rigorous complaint investigation and resolution procedures, reviewing serious incidents and developing lessons for improved practice, implementing more restrictive force policies (especially in the area of deadly force), upgrading conflict resolution skills, and deploying less-lethal weapons (Alpert and Dunham, 2004; Davis, Mateu-Gelabert and Miller, 2005; Prenzler et al., 2013; Walker, Alpert and Kenney, 2001) . While the available evidence to-date around these strategies is fairly strong, it remains limited in scope. The present study aimed to enlarge the evidence base through a detailed case study of the efforts of the Portland Police Bureau (PPB) and the Independent Police Review Division (IPR) to reduce police use of force and citizen complaints.
Setting
The Portland Police Bureau was selected for this study on the basis of published reports of large reductions in force-related measures (Porter, 2013 Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, PPB officers were accused of racial bias and prejudice towards minority communities (Alpert, Cawthray, Rojek and Ferdik, 2015) . These issues were followed in the late-1980s and early-1990s by a spate of officer-involved shootings. The Internal Affairs Unit had a questionable record on police accountability, and in 1982 the City established, by public vote, the Police Internal Investigations Auditing Committee (Mayor's PIIAC Work Group, 2000) . The committee had subpoena power but it was limited to asking questions about the internal investigations process. On-going controversy led to a 'Police Accountability Campaign' in 2000, and a review by the Mayor's office led to the establishment of the IPR within the Office of the City Auditor in 2002 (IPR, 2004) . The IPR is subject to advice and monitoring by a Citizen Review Committee (CRC).
The IPR is responsible for receiving and processing the majority of complaints made against PPB sworn officers (www.portlandonline.com/auditor/?c=26646). The PPB Internal Affairs Division (IAD) can also initiate investigations. Complaints are subject to an initial IPR investigation and then assigned for various responses including dismissal, mediation or follow-up investigation by the IAD. The IAD classifies complaints as either a 'Service Improvement Opportunity' (SIO) or in need of a full administrative investigation. SIOs are addressed as non-disciplinary complaints that require coaching from an officer's direct supervisor. The IPR plays an audit role with SIOs and a more involved role in administrative investigations -with access to evidence, and a role in interviews and review of findings. The IAD can decline to take formal action on a complaint with the approval of the IPR if the allegations are unsupported. In cases of officer-involved shootings, the IPR plays a dual role of reviewing past investigations and monitoring ongoing investigations. The findings on complaints can be appealed to the CRC, which can act by majority vote to recommend further investigations, support the original finding or recommend an alternative finding. Alternative findings are referred to the Police Chief and Police Commissioner, and the CRC can appeal a rejection to the City Council, which then makes the final decision.
Method
A case study methodology was adopted by examining the evolving policies, strategies and performance indicators of the PPB focused on the 13 year period 2002 to 2014 following the establishment of the IPR. No complaint data were available prior to 2000. Data on officerinvolved-shootings were available back to 1991. The Portland case appears to be unique in the extraordinary amount of material publicly available on police use of force and complaint management issues. Reports by the IPR were used to extract data on complaints and allegations, as well as use of force reports and officer-involved shootings. These reports were obtained in electronic form from the website of the City Auditor. Data on the numbers of sworn officers were collated from PPB annual reports and the PPB directly for 2014. In addition, electronic reports were accessed from the City of Portland, US Department of Justice, the Police Assessment Resource Centre (PARC) and the OIR Group. Together, these sources were used to document changes in oversight, complaints management, policies, procedures, standards and training that appeared to relate to the changes in the quantitative data on complaints and force.
The project also involved direct input from the PPB and IPR, beginning with a meeting in 2013 between one of the authors and the Captain in charge of the Professional Standards Division, two other officers in the Division, and the IPR Director. In 2015 a draft report was created by the authors drawing exclusively on public record material. The draft was shared with senior officers in the Professional Standards Division, the IPR Director and the IPR Senior Management Analyst. The group agreed to correct any errors, update data where possible, and provide explanatory comments. The final version of the paper was accepted by all parties but without any attempt to interfere with the authors' interpretations.
The study has a number of limitations, although a variety of controls contribute to the reliability of the findings. The force and complaint reduction strategies evolved over time as a natural experiment. Consequently, as is often the case, the project did not include the allocation of matched subjects to experimental and control groups. In that regard, the project is not consistent with the 'gold standard' of scientific evaluation (Farrington, et al., 2002) . Nonetheless, the researchers were able to triangulate four data sources -complaints, allegations, force reports and officer-involved shootings -and also identify a number of factors that serve as partial controls in identifying possible influences on changes in outcome measures. In addition, complaint trends were examined where available from comparable cities and there was some capacity to assess alternative explanations for observable changes. The method applies Blatter and Haverland's idea of 'process tracing' (2014) and Pawson and Tilley's (2004) concept of 'realist evaluation'. Due to limitations on resources and the reporting format the researchers were not able to exhaust every possible evidence source (Pawson and Tilley, 2004) . However, sufficient evidence was assessed to allow plausible inferences to be made about program changes and outcome measures, and these set a baseline for further evaluation.
Findings 1: Quantitative trends
Complaints Table 1 shows the total number of public, or 'community', complaints received by the IPR (and prior to 2002 the PPB) and key dispositions. Overall, total community complaints reduced, fairly steadily, by 54.4%, from a high of 831 complaints in 2000 to 379 in 2014. Table 1 also shows that the rate of referral of complaints from the IAD to the PPB IAD, following initial assessment, trended downwards from a peak of 41% in 2003 to around 20% from 2012 to 2014. The table also shows an overall downward trend in the number of complaints classified by the IAD as 'Service Improvement Opportunities' and the number formally investigated. The sustained rate of investigated complaints, for 'one or more sustained findings', trended upwards from a low of 10% in 2005 to a high of 66% in 2014.
>Table 1<
Data were also accessed on multiple complaints against individual officers from 2002 to 2014, shown in Table 2 . The data combine community complaints and internal or 'Bureau' complaints. This is the only format available for consistent historical data on multiple complaints. Large reductions are apparent in the numbers of officers receiving multiple complaints and multiple force-related complaints in the first six years of data, tapering out towards the end.
>Table 2<

Allegations
Complaints often contain multiple allegations. The categories used in Portland are shown in Table 3 , which includes the number of allegations in each category alongside the rate of allegations per sworn officer. An initial increase in allegations was followed by long-term declines. From the peak of 2,827 in 2003, the number dropped by 72.0% to 789 in 2014. The rate of allegations per sworn officer reached its highest point in 2003 at 2.85 and then trended downwards to a low of 0.84 in 2013, representing a fall of 70.5%. A large part of the decline in allegation numbers involved a dramatic 86.9% reduction in Conduct allegations. There were also large reductions across other categories, including Courtesy (51.9%), Disparate Treatment (79.3%) and Procedure (50.9%).
>Table 3<
The two force-related allegation types are 'Control Technique', alleging 'a control technique was used unreasonably or improperly [e.g.,] control holds, hobbles, take-downs, and handcuffing'; and 'Force' allegations of 'excessive or inappropriate physical force' (IPR, 2005, p. 19) . Figure 1 
Officer-involved shootings
Data on officer-involved shootings were available for 1991 to 2014, and resulting fatalities from 1992 to 2014. Figure 4 shows large fluctuations. In 1992, PPB officers were involved in 12 shootings and 5 resulting deaths, the highest recorded number across the 22 year period. In the last eight years on record, shootings averaged 3.3 per year and fatalities averaged 1.75.
>Figure 3<
Comparative data
Considerable efforts were made to find long-term trend data for complaints against police and use of force for cities similar to Portland. Some guidance was obtained from the Major Cities Chiefs Association. An initial search was made of the websites of police departments of 10 cities nearest in size to Portland. In addition, searches were conducted on other major city police websites. A total of 34 websites were searched. The majority did not publish consistent data, and many did not publish data as rates nor sworn officer numbers. The results are too detailed to be reported here but can be obtained from the authors. Numbers from 2002 to 2014 were obtained in 14 categories: Complaints from Albuquerque, Columbus, Washington DC, Denver, New York City and Oakland; force allegations from Washington DC, Denver, NYC and Oakland; shooting incidents from Denver and NYC; and fatal shootings from Denver and NYC. Diverse trends were apparent, including numerous stable patterns and some moderate downward trends. However, no police department showed the large and consistent falls across all categories used in this study as reported in Portland.
Findings 2: Key changes
The following subsection outlines major changes in policies and practices which took place over the period under examination. The narrative account is presented both thematically and chronologically to assist in relating the changes to data trends documented in the findings section above. The main initiatives are summarised in a timeline format in Table 4 .
>Table 4<
Upgraded complaint processing
In 2002 the IPR opened its doors, introducing the new complaint processing system while conducting an extensive community outreach program (IPR, 2003) . This was accompanied by efforts to develop cooperative links with the PPB IAD through the provision of joint officer training in ethics and complaint processes, as well as shared tracking of complaints (IPR, 2005) . In 2005 the IPR improved the rigour of intake investigations to allow better identification of unprovable or frivolous complaints (IPR, 2008) . In 2006 the Director allowed investigators limited authority to dismiss some categories of minor complaints at intake (IPR, 2007) .
Early intervention system
The IPR and PPB worked together to introduce measures to help reduce complaints. This began as early as 2003 when complaint statistics were used to brief patrol shifts (IPR, 2005) . In 2004, the IAD, with IPR assistance, began work on establishing an Early Intervention System (EIS). The system was developed further in 2005 and 2006 with the introduction of an Employee Information System drawing on data from the IPR, the City Risk Management Department, state courts system and District Attorney's Office (IPR, 2008) . This allowed supervisor ready access to a wide range of information. The PPB installed the system on sergeants' computers and precinct management teams began utilising the system to review officer use of force. In 2006 the IPR began referring some post-dismissal complaints to police precinct commanders, as well as reviewing and monitoring tort claims lodged against police alleging misconduct (IPR, 2008). The capability of the EIS was further enhanced with the completion of a Case Management System in 2008 (IPR, 2009). The system includes a 'discussion tracker' where supervisors can place positive or negative comments on officers. Threshold alerts allow supervisors to track officer performance on variables including complaints and arrest-to-force ratios. If a threshold is breached, a review process is activated and monitored through the EIS. Actions include supervisor-officer debriefings and 'nondisciplinary guidance, additional training, or employee assistance' (IPR, 2009, p. 33) .
Shootings reviews
In 2002, the IPR, in cooperation with the PPB, initiated the first of two major reform projects in the area of force. The Police Assessment Resource Center (PARC) was contracted to undertake an independent review of 32 officer involved shootings. PARC's first report concluded that, while some incidents showed good practice, many revealed deficiencies in management and tactics leading to unnecessary risk of harm (PARC, 2003, p. 2) . The report included 89 recommendations for improvement. In response, the PPB instituted a range of reforms including mandatory use of force reporting, on a prescribed form, and revisions of the deadly force policy (IPR, 2005 (IPR, , 2006 . In mid-2005, the PPB formed the Use of Force Review Board. The Board includes citizen, police officer and PPB management representatives. It reviews all officer-involved shootings, cases of serious injury that result in hospitalisation, in-custody deaths, out of policy less-lethal force incidents and cases referred by the Chief or Assistant Chief (PARC, 2006) . The objective is to assess officers' handling of incidents to identify any issues of concern and lessons that can be learned. The PPB also improved its critical incident management capabilities through the creation of a Critical Incident Command system, as well as the provision of training to specialist officers and then to new and serving officers from 2006 (PPB, 2012).
Use of force review and further tightening of policies
The second major reform project undertaken by the IPR and PPB commenced in 2006 with the establishment of a Force Task Force, consisting of representatives of the Bureau, the IPR and the Citizen Review Committee. The Force Task Force was charged with analysing use of force data in order to 'develop recommendations for the Chief of Police designed to improve the Bureau's management of force and reduce the number of public complaints involving force' (Force Task Force 2007, p. 1). The main data source was the use of force reports. One of the findings was that between 2004 and 2006 not one citizen complaint regarding excessive force was sustained by the Bureau. This was set against a national average of 8-14% (p. 8). The deficit was in part attributed to an overly discretionary policy on force and possible inadequate standards regarding acceptable force levels.
After conducting its review, the Force Task Force (2007) made a number of major recommendations including the following: a requirement that each use of force report include a justification for force, all reports to include an assessment of their completeness and validity by the officer's supervisor, all violations of policy had to be reported, that the force policy include clearer standards, more focus be given to the need to reduce provocative behaviour by officers, complaint investigations must include more attention to the longer range circumstances leading up to incidents, all force complaints must involve a debriefing with the officer, and the threshold for interventions through the EIS should be lowered.
In response to these recommendations, a range of changes was introduced. In 2007, the PPB instituted supervisor debriefings for all force complaints and an internal use of force review team (IPR, 2008) . In 2008, it implemented a revised force policy emphasising confrontation management skills and minimisation of force (PARC, 2009) . A new training regime for recruits was rolled out that included revised in-service and scenario based training, tactics discussions led by trainers, and peer performance critiques (PPB, 2012) . This was further enhanced by semi-annual performance reviews of every officer's use of force.
Enlarged oversight
In 2010, a unanimous vote by the City Council authorised a substantial enlargement of oversight of the PPB and increased transparency (IPR, 2011, pp. 2-3) . The IPR obtained power to compel citizen testimony and obtain evidence, and it was given authority to challenge the findings and disciplinary outcomes of administrative investigations. In addition, the IPR Director obtained a seat, with voting rights, on the PPB's disciplinary Review Board. This entailed increasing the number of civilian representatives on the Board to two, while police membership was reduced to three. The IPR also now sends a member of its management team to the scene of each shooting incident and monitors all aspects of the policy review conducted following the incident (IPR, 2013) . Oversight capability has also been extended by the Portland City Auditor contracting specialist consulting groups to examine force issues. These include PARC (above) and the OIR Group (e.g., OIR Group, 2012) .
Agreement with the Department of Justice
In 2011 an investigation was launched by the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice. The September 2012 report identified a pattern of excessive force by PPB officers against persons suffering mental illness (Department of Justice, 2012). The report highlighted deficiencies in training and supervisor reviews of force reports, as well as excessive delays and under-utilisation of the complaints investigations and early intervention systems. The PPB and IPR responded to the investigation as it developed. In 2011, the Bureau instituted training in less-lethal decision making focused on mentally distressed persons, and established an Inspector position to track use of force (PPB, 2012) . In 2012 it altered its policy to require supervisors to attend the scene of use of force incidents and conduct an investigation. In late-2012 the City developed an agreement with the Department of Justice (2012), setting out a program of further reforms to address these issues. In 2013, a revised Electronic Control Weapon (ECW) policy raised the threshold for ECW use to 'active aggression' by the suspect. In addition, an ECW could only be deployed during a flight attempt if the 'subject presents an immediate threat of physical injury' or if there is 'a significant danger to the public, officers or the subject' (OIR Group 2013, p. 95). In March 2014 the PPB released its first progress report on the reform package, noting the creation of crisis units and delivery of crisis training (PPB, 2014) .
Discussion
The quantitative data presented in the first part of this study's findings showed large-scale long-term reductions in public complaints against Portland police officers and in officer use of force reports. Within the complaints data there were large declines in all types of allegations, including the two force categories. There was also an overall downward trend in officer-involved shootings and fatalities, but with a persistent problem of fatal shootings including two each year for the last three years. Part 2 of the findings section of the paper summarised the main changes to policies and procedures, developed primarily in cooperation between the PPB and IPR, which appeared to relate broadly to the changes in the quantitative data. Isolating the effect of any one of these initiatives is problematic but there do appear to be a number of associations which should be considered as evidence of influence in the absence of other explanations, and these mirror the findings reported in the literature section about apparent effective strategies to reduce complaints and force incidents. Overall, it appears that a series of initiatives and modifications introduced over 13 years had a compounding effect in improving police conduct and procedures, with associated reductions in complaints and indicators of inappropriate force. These initiatives are analysed in greater depth in the following paragraphs and serve as potential models for police departments wishing to reduce police force, excessive force and citizen alienation.
In the first place, the creation of the IPR meant that the PPB was put on notice by the City Council that reform was expected, and that a permanent well-resourced and empowered independent agency was in place whose sole task was to make the police more accountable by analysing performance data and prodding and prompting the Bureau to make improvements. The IPR has reported that its establishment in 2002 stimulated an initial increase in complaints and allegations (Figure 1 ) before a long-term decline set in. The increase was explained in terms of greater confidence in the complaints management system, but also a spike in complaints related to the policing of Iraq War protests in 2003 (IPR, 2004) .
The literature indicates that there are police forces that have made large reductions in complaints and force indicators largely at their own initiative (Prenzler et al., 2013) . The Portland case shows that police can also work cooperatively with oversight agencies to achieve positive results (Porter, 2013) . Oversight agencies can add resources, expertise and alternative perspectives to the process, but with the potential for criticism and adversarial responses if needed. In the Portland case, co-operation appears to have predominated. The 2009 PARC review cited the 'mutually respectful and productive' working relationship between the Police Bureau and the IPR' (PARC, 2009, p. 3) . The review also noted that 'Chief Rosanne Sizer and her command staff have worked diligently and in good faith to improve the Portland Police Bureau' and that PARC's earlier recommendations had been implemented 'effectively and with seriousness of purpose' (PARC, 2009, p.1) .
The engagement of the specialist research and consulting firm PARC was a major innovation that appeared to bear fruit, with the PPB committing to implement the recommendations of the comprehensive 2003 PARC review of use of force issues. The follow up reports were also important in obtaining an expert independent assessment of the implementation process and to identify scope for further improvements. The PPB successfully implemented use of force reporting by officers and in 2005 it tightened its deadly force policy, restricting justifiable deadly force to situations where there is a threat to human life or of serious injury and where officers have no reasonable alternatives (PARC, 2003, p. 42) . The tightened policy was consistent with the view that police forces need to clearly specify what situations justify what types of force (Atherley and Hickman, 2014) . The highest number of force-related allegations were recorded in 2004, followed by long-term declines. There were large reductions in officer-involved shootings and fatal shootings after 2005 -although there was something of a regression in later years.
The establishment of the Force Task Force in 2006 also appeared to bear fruit. Further reductions in force-related complaints followed from the implementation of Task Force recommendations related to supervisor debriefings for force complaints and a revised force policy emphasising de-escalation, minimum force and better critical incident management. From 2006 to 2008 a new training regime was introduced that emphasized communication, de-escalation and less-lethal force; and included scenario-based and in-service training, with tactics discussions and peer performance appraisals (PPB, 2012) . This was further enhanced by semi-annual performance reviews of every officer's use of force (PPB, 2012) . The data presented in Table 3 Research has shown that early intervention systems can have a large positive impact upon complaints numbers, including excessive force allegations Fleming, 2012, Walker et al., 2001) . In Portland, the EIS initiative, begun in 2004, included purposebuilt software pulling in multiple data sources to allow supervisors to closely monitor officer performance and pre-empt bad habits. From 2011, the new system optimised the capacity to identify problematic behavioural trends at multiple tiers, facilitating interventions at the officer level. These developments appear to have coincided with large falls in multiple complaints against individual officers from 2004, as shown in Table 2 , with smaller declines in multiple complaints from around 2007.
Greater rigour in the complaints system may also have contributed to improved conduct. Increased substantiation rates from 2006 may have provided a greater deterrent to misconduct, as well as giving greater authority to remedial interventions (cf. Porter et al. 2012) . At the same time, better filtering by the IPR also appears to have facilitated investigation of a greater proportion of complaints referred to the IAD. Cooperation between the two agencies also means that officers are less likely to feel that the department will automatically support them against the oversight agency.
One of the more notable changes was to develop a more robust internal review process. The PPB strengthened its review capability by establishing a Use of Force Review Board in 2005. This was praised by PARC as 'an effective and credible review process' for identifying appropriate lessons (2006, pp. 1-2). The process is informed by Training Division reviews of incidents (OIR Group, 2012, pp. 72-73) . PARC found the PPB had, 'an increased capacity for self-critical identification of issues and formulation of solutions ' (2009, p. 1; cf., Atherley and Hickman, 2014) , while the OIR Group stated that the PPB was 'superior to most comparable law enforcement agencies in the way it reviews critical incidents' (2012, pp. 1-2).
Despite these significant achievements, the 2012 DOJ investigation report demonstrated the need for further reform and the benefits of enlarged external input. It is too early to observe the long-range impacts of the DOJ report in the area of police management of mental health incidents. The indicative data on complaints and use of force from this study for 2013 and 2014 are encouraging. At the same time, consideration could be given to additional integrity management measures. For example, there are encouraging indicators emerging of large reductions in complaints and force reports with the adoption of officer body-worn cameras (Ariel, Farrar and Sutherland, 2015) .
Finally, it should again be noted that the study was not able to control for all possible influences on the trends in performance indicators. Examples include changes to the numbers of officers on patrol, changes in officer demographics (including gender, age and education) or declines in public confidence in the complaints system. At the same time, there was no evidence of officers being less assertive in responding to crime. As noted in the 'Setting' section of the paper, although crime declined significantly in Portland in the last decade, calls for police service and incidents attended by police remained fairly stable, trending upwards slightly. In addition, the large improvements in Portland, across multiple data sources, appear unique in comparison to available data from comparable and major police departments in the United States.
Conclusion
This study showed that the Portland Police Bureau experienced large, long-term, reductions in recorded complaints and other indicators of the adverse use of force. In the same period, the Bureau and the Independent Police Review agency developed a positive working relationship. Key initiatives included tightened use of force policies and procedures, improved training in de-escalation tactics and less-lethal response options, and an information and evidenced-based approach to risk management. The establishment of a credible oversight body with an active and authoritative role in the complaint process is also likely to have improved accountability and helped drive increasingly proactive responses to problems by the Bureau.
Police-community alienation, and excessive and inappropriate force by police, are major problems around the world. It is possible that police agencies making similar changes to policies, procedures and rules will achieve comparable results; and the more areas of police practice that are addressed the more likely it will be that agencies achieve large improvements. However, the most important recommendation to come from this study is not to endorse any single strategy or set of strategies but to emphasise the value of an explicit force reduction and public complaint reduction strategy using a problem solving methodology. This entails data-based diagnostics, deployment of multiple conduct indicators, close monitoring of apparent impacts, and responsive adjustments of strategies over time.
